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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Court Erred by Dismissing the Case on a Ground Different From That Raised in 
its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, to Wit: Mr. Tapp Was Not Deprived of His Right to 
Testify 
1. The court dismissed on a ground not raised in its notice of intent to dismiss 
The district court's statement that it "now raises the issue of whether this matter should 
be summarily dismissed under a Chapman analysis" was insufficient to give Mr. Tapp notice that 
it intended to determine whether Mr. Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), was a harmless error case, not a right to testify case. The court's 
reference to a "Chapman analysis" did not give notice that the district court intended to do 
anything other than a harmless error analysis based upon the assumption that Mr. Tapp's right to 
testify had been violated. 
The state now argues that the court's citation to Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,274 
P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), was sufficient to raise both issues, but a close analysis of Rossignol 
belies the state's argument. In Rossignol, the Court cites Chapman for the proposition that the 
petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a constitutional error and the state then has 
the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 152 Idaho at 703,274 
P.3d at 4. But that is a misreading of Chapman, which does not address the burden of proving 
the constitutional violation. 386 U.S. at 20. ("We granted certiorari limited to these questions: 
'Where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 
L.Ed.2d 106, (1) can the error be held to be harmless, and (2) if so, was the error harmless in this 
case?"') Thus, a Chapman analysis can only be fairly understood to mean a harmless error 
analysis. And, while Rossignol requires Mr. Tapp to eventually establish a constitutional 
violation, the district court did not give notice that it was conducting a "Rossignol analysis." 
The state next argues that any error was harmless because Mr. "Tapp actually responded 
to the waiver issue[.]" State's Brief, pg. 22. While, Mr. Tapp did object to the state raising the 
issue and addressed the state's argument, he was still harmed because he was deprived of the 
twenty days to respond mandated by I.C. § 19-4906(b) and Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 
P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009). This Court should vacate the order and remand for further 
proceedings. 
2. The state raising the issue for the first time in its response to the court's notice of 
intent to dismiss was not a proper motion for summary dismissal on its part and 
the argument should not have been considered 
The state does not address this issue in its brief other than to argue that the court's notice 
was adequate. No further reply to that argument is required. 
3. Even if the state's argument could be considered a second motion for summary 
dismissal, the court erred by dismissing the petition without giving Mr. Tapp 
twenty days to respond 
Again, the state does not address this issue in its brief other than to argue that the court's 
notice was adequate. And again, no further reply to that argument is required. 
B. Alternatively, the Question of Whether Mr. Tapp Validly Waived His Right to Testify is 
a Material Issue of Fact and the Trial Court Erred by Resolving a Factual Issue 
Against Mr. Tapp During the Summary Disposition Proceedings 
The state next argues that it was appropriate for the district court to find Mr. Tapp 
"voluntarily waived his rights because the record contradicts his claim." State's Brief, pg. 24. 
However, all the state cites in support is testimony from the original post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing where the issue was why Mr. Tapp didn't testify at the suppression hearing. Mr. Booker 
was asked to describe his impressions about Mr. Tapp's desire or willingness to testify at the 
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suppression hearing. T (#40197) pg. 171, In. 24. And Mr. Booker's testimony was only that Mr. 
Tapp was opposed to testifying, not that he was informed of his absolute right to testify and then 
voluntarily and intelligently waived that right. The questions put to Mr. Tapp also dealt with the 
decision to testify at the suppression hearing. Mr. Tapp testified that "I asked if it would be 
proper for me to testify at the motion to suppress. Mr. Booker told me no." T (#40197) pg. 140, 
In. 11-22. While this contradicts Mr. Booker's testimony that Mr. Tapp was fearful about and 
opposed to testifying, Mr. Tapp never testified about why he did not testify at trial. Nothing in 
the record clearly disproves the allegations in the petition and his affidavits. Mr. Tapp alleged 
under oath that Mr. Booker did not permit him to testify even though he told Mr. Booker that he 
wanted to do so. CR 59-61; 101-102. There is nothing in the criminal trial record which 
contradicts that. His statements create a question of material fact, even taking Mr. Booker's non-
responsive, non-challenged and incomplete comment into consideration. 
The state next argues that "it was appropriate for the court to find [Mr.] Tapp voluntarily 
waived his rights because the record contradicts the claim." State's Brief, pg. 24. However, a 
court may only ignore a petitioner's verified allegations when the "allegations are clearly 
disproved by the record of the original proceedings." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570,225 
P.3d 700, 703 (2010) quoting Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 (2007) 
(emphasis added). Mr. Tapp's allegations are not clearly disproved. Mr. Booker and Mr. Tapp 
disagree and the evidence in the record is in conflict. This is a quintessential question of material 
fact. Compare Workman, supra (petitioner's sworn statements during guilty plea colloquy 
clearly disproved later claim of involuntary plea due to being under the influence of psychoactive 
drugs). 
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Next, the state asks this Court to draw an adverse inference against Mr. Tapp by 
concluding that he likely waived his right to testify at trial because he did not question counsel 
telling him it would not be proper to testify at the suppression hearing. State's Brief, pg. 25. 
However, the state's argument does not logically follow. It is just as likely that Mr. Tapp was 
willing to defer to counsel's judgment at the suppression hearing, but unwilling to do so at the 
trial. As between the two inferences, the latter seems the more likely since Mr. Booker's strategy 
at the suppression hearing was totally unsuccessful and Mr. Tapp's confidence in his attorney 
was no doubt lower at the trial than at the motion to suppress hearing. At the trial, Mr. Tapp was 
present when the jury heard the evidence about his statements, saw the effect the evidence had on 
the jury, and knew Mr. Booker had no evidence, such as an expert witness on false confessions, 
to explain why the statements should not be credited, except Mr. Tapp's testimony. 
Finally, the state asserts that Rossignol, supra, does not foreclose summary disposition in 
this case "because the record supports the conclusion that Tapp ... did not wish to [testify.]" 
State's Brief, pg. 26, ft. 8. But again, the record "supports" such a conclusion only if the court 
improperly draws an adverse inference against Mr. Tapp from the conflicting evidence found 
therein. 
Under the proper standard for reviewing disputed evidence upon summary disposition, 
the trial court erred in resolving a disputed question of material fact against Mr. Tapp without 
holding an evidentiary hearing. That portion of the order should be reversed. 
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C. The Court Erred in Concluding That the Violation of Mr. Tapp's Right to Testify Was 
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
1. Mr. Tapp's testimony would have corroborated his alibi defense 
The state complains that Mr. Tapp never argued that the deprivation of his right to testify 
was not harmless error, in part because he could have corroborated his alibi defense, until the 
district court raised the harmless error issue. State's Brief, pg. 27. That sequence of events 
should be no surprise to the state, however, since it bore the burden of proving harmless error, 
and a petitioner is not required to disprove defenses in the petition. See, Anderson v. State, 133 
Idaho 788, 792, 992 P.2d 783, 787 (Ct. App. 1999) (petition does not need to allege facts 
negating affirmative defense); see also Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,770,215 P.3d 485, 
490 (2009) ("[W]e conclude that a nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed 
affirmative defense on a motion for summary judgment."). Thus, Mr. Tapp did not "alter" his 
claim that "trial counsel refused to permit petitioner to testify at the criminal trial even though 
petitioner specifically asked to testify" when he refuted the state's harmless error argument in 
part by noting his testimony would have bolstered his alibi defense in addition to explaining the 
circumstances of his false confession. The question of harmless error was not an element of the 
right to testify claim and the facts negating the state's defense did not have to be pleaded. 
The state's citation to Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532,314 P.3d 587,591 (2013) is not 
apposite. Fields involved a successive petition in a capital case and was therefore subject to the 
heightened pleading requirements ofl.C. § 19-2719(5). 1 Likewise, its citation to Kelly v. State, 
1 The Fields Court specifically notes that the rules in capital cases are different than in 
non-capital. "For post-conviction procedure in capital cases, however, LC. § 19-2719 governs to 
the extent that the statute conflicts with the UPCP A." Fields, supra. 
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149 Idaho 517,523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010), sheds no light on the question here. Mr. Kelly 
did not raise his prosecutorial misconduct claim "in his petition or supporting affidavit," but only 
in argument. Id. Here, Mr. Tapp raised his right to testify claim in both his successive petition 
and his affidavits. 
2. Mr. Tapp's testimony would have explained the circumstances of the false 
confession 
The state notes that the district court could have considered the statements suppressed by 
the Court of Appeals as impeachment evidence. State's Brief, pg. 29. However, such 
consideration does not aid the state's cause. It was the position of the state at trial that the 
admissions made on January 29 were evidence of guilt. Mr. Tapp's testimony would have been 
that his confession was false and that he was manipulated and later coerced into making the 
statements. If the state then chose to introduce the suppressed statements as impeachment, it 
would have harmed its own case and aided Mr. Tapp's testimony because the other statements 
differed from the January 29 statements. The fact that Mr. Tapp made multiple, inconsistent 
statements before and after January 29 would not have impeached his testimony that the 
statements he made to the police were false. The inconsistency helps to prove the falsity. 
Finally, Mr. Tapp takes the state's impeachment evidence argument as an implicit 
concession that the district court could not consider the illegally obtained evidence as substantive 
evidence. In addition, he notes that the state does not argue there is a way to detem1ine what 
evidence the trial court considered as substantive evidence of guilt and what evidence it 
considered merely as impeachment. Consequently, the harmless error finding at a minimum 
should be vacated and the matter remanded for the court to reconsider the question using the 
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illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes only. 
D. Murphy v. State is Not Yet Final and the Court Should Permit Supplemental Briefing 
if Rehearing of the Opinion is Not Granted 
Mr. Tapp draws the Court's attention to the recent decision in Murphy v. State, -Idaho 
-, -P.3d-, 2014 WL 712695 (Feb. 25, 2014). Mr. Tapp understands that the petitioner in 
Murphy intends to file a Petition for Rehearing so the finality of the ruling is still in doubt. If the 
case becomes final, this Court should permit the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing 
the constitutionality of its holding and the applicability thereof to Mr. Tapp's case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by finding that Mr. Tapp had not made a prima facie case of a 
constitutional violation. While there is evidence that he was opposed to testifying, there is also 
evidence that he told his attorney he wanted to testify and was told he could not. There is a 
question of material fact and the court should have granted an evidentiary hearing. 
The trial court also erred by finding any error harmless. In fact, the state's evidence, 
excluding the January 29 interview, was not strong and Mr. Tapp had a viable alibi defense. Mr. 
Tapp could have testified that he made a false confession because he was isolated from others, 
kept against his will, harangued, manipulated, and threatened with prison and worse ifhe did not 
confess. He also could have testified that he was with Britney Morgan at the time of the murder. 
Accordingly, the state has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. 
For all the reasons set forth above in the Opening Brief and above, this Court should 
vacate the district court's summary dismissal of the successive petition and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this-3v-J day of March, 2014. 
µ~~ ,.,,._ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Christopher Tapp 
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